



DEPT OF CIVIL AVIATION
1 101 1146

A52-616

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEPHONE: 59.

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE AND QUOTE

No. 616.

RECEIVED
10 SEP
1945

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION,

GOVERNMENT AERODROME,

Box 31, G.P.O.,
ALICE SPRINGS N.T.

3rd. September, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR :

Director-General,
Department of Civil Aviation,
522-536 Lt. Collins Street,
MELBOURNE, C.1 .. Vic.

ACCIDENT TO MOSQUITO A52-616 ON LANDING ALICE SPRINGS.

Herewith attached reports by Mr. W.H. Jowett, Aeradio Operator, and Mr. E. Curtis, Assistant Control Officer, regarding the landing of a Mosquito A52-616 on this aerodrome Monday, 3rd. inst. from Coomallie Creek. Unfortunately, some damage was occasioned by the aircraft which may become the subject of enquiry by the R.A.A.F., in which case the following and attached are forwarded.

2. From the original departure message, from Coomallie Creek, A52-616 was due to arrive Alice Springs 13.45 C.S.T. At approximately 13.00 C.S.T. the aircraft was heard roughly overhead and very high (probably 16,000 feet as that was the height advised the machine would be flying enroute direct from Coomallie Creek to Alice Springs).

3. For the next 45 minutes approximately the aircraft carried out circuits in the vicinity of the aerodrome and occasionally around it - as it was assumed that the aircraft would make a safe landing, not all circuits were personally observed by myself. But it would appear that the pilot had not correctly ascertained the direction of the wind, as Mr. Curtis states that he had occasion to fire a Red Verrey Light when he observed that the aircraft was approaching to make a down-wind landing on runway 30 (5117 feet).

4. The aircraft then regained altitude and as it was nearing the Northwest end of runway 30, a white Verrey Light was fired in an endeavour to indicate that the aircraft should land on runway 12 into wind. Another circuit was made and the aircraft came in on runway 35 (3550 feet) against a Red Verrey Light, which was fired whilst the aircraft was still on approach. It is possible that this latter was not seen by the pilot.

5. Unable to pull up in time, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 35, over runway 12/30, finally coming to a stop at 13.45 C.S.T., after swerving to starboard, inside the fence.

6. As the sealed surfaces were cleared, the aircraft's port tail plane hit one runway light and one range light, one or both of which caused some damage to the leading edge of the elevator and to the underneath surface of the port tailplane.

7. As on the two occasions of approach the aircraft was to land into the wrong direction, it, again, would appear that the pilot had not observed the wind direction from either of the two wind indicators (one on the north and the other on the south sides of the aerodrome), flags and even from smoke of the fired Verrey Lights. During the period 13.30 U.S.T. to 14.00 C.S.T. the

Handwritten notes:
DAN
11/9/45
D.A.W.

(Cont'd).

Meteorological people had observed the ground wind to be Southeast 10/15 knots, as had been from 12.15 C.S.T. The visibility was 25 to 30 miles during the whole time.

8. At no time was radio contact established - watch being maintained on 3270, 6540 Kcs. and sweeps made about 4495 Kcs. from time to time, purely on the offchance that the aircraft may have been using that frequency, before the aircraft landed. It was subsequently learned that the aircraft was receiving and transmitting 4495 Kcs., a frequency not installed in this Station's transmitters.

9. It is difficult to realise that the aircraft's radio was not set up to transmit 6540 Kcs. and receive 6565 Kcs., as the equipment apparently covered up to 4495 Kcs. unless, of course, the bands fitted to the transmitter and receiver could not be adjusted to 6540 and 6565 Kcs. respectively.

10. Mr. Jowett, at various times, gave landing information on 325, 345, and 6565 Kcs. addressed to A52-616. Also he enquired of the R.A.A.F. H/F D/F, vide his report, who advised they had not been in contact with the aircraft.

11. The pilot enquired as to why a wind-tee was not installed and as far as can be recollected on this station, this is the first time such a query has been raised. Aircraft of various types, with and without radio, have made safe landings without experiencing any difficulty, confirming visually or ascertaining visually the wind direction under similar weather conditions as today.

12. From the experience of a wind-tee constructed by the R.A.A.F. and in use for a short time several years ago, unless it is of such light construction as to be operated by a wind as low as 5 m.p.h., it is likely to be more dangerous than without. In this case, the wind-tee was removed on the requests of several pilots as it had been too heavy to be actuated by anything less than 25 m.p.h. and as a result often gave misleading direction leading to cross-wind and down-wind landings. If not to be actuated by the prevailing wind, the other alternative would be to have some one readily available at all times to attend to it as the wind altered.

P. Richardson
(P. Richardson),
Officer-in-Charge.

Signed: *[Signature]*
Duty Radio Officer

A/DANS.

*Forwarded
2/11/45*



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEPHONE:
ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE AND QUOTE
No.....

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION,
GOVERNMENT AERODROME,
ALICE SPRINGS
3/9/1945

Memorandum for,
Director-General,
Dept. of Civil Aviation,
522 Little Collins Street,
MELBOURNE, VIC.

B

Accident to R.A.A.F. Mosquito A52/616.

No transmitting or receiving frequencies were included in the departure signal concerning this aircraft and no radio contact was established during flight.

When the machine was heard circling the 'drome the station level pressure and surface wind were obtained from the Meteorological Section and transmitted on spec to the aircraft on frequencies of 325,345(homer) and 6565kcs. No acknowledgement was received. Watch was maintained on 3270,6540 and, at intervals, 4495kcs.

As no response was heard from the aircraft it was thought that the R.A.A.F. H/F/D/F might possibly be QSO but enquiry to that section merely elicited the information that they had not heard any signals from the machine.

Subsequent to the landing of the aircraft advice was received that it had been transmitting and receiving on 4495 kcs, a frequency that is not, of course, available on any of the Departmental transmitters at this station.

It may not be out of place to point out here that this is the second instance in a week of a service aircraft arriving at this aerodrome, southbound, incorrectly briefed insofar as aeradio communication is concerned, though in the previous case the machine in question, VHCTQ, was in constant communication with the R.A.A.F. H/F D/F, enabling the necessary information to be sent and received through that channel.

Signed:

[Handwritten Signature]
Duty Aeradio Officer.

*Forwarded.
P.A. 3/9/45.*

E. CURTIS
E. Curtis
A.O.P.



A52-616

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEPHONE:

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION,
GOVERNMENT AERODROME.

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE AND QUOTE

ALICE SPRINGS
POX. 31. G.P.O.

No.

3.9.45.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL
DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION
522. LITTLE COLLINS ST.
MELBOURNE VIC.

DEAR SIR.

The following is my report re the landing of A52-616
R.A.A.F. MGSQUITC.

A52-616 dep Coomalie Creek 0947C bound Alice Springs eta Alice 1447C
proposed height for flight 16000.ft.

At 1300C A52-616 came in from the north at great height; too
high to see from the ground.

It circled still out of sight for 16 minutes; then at lower
levels for 20 minutes gradually getting lower.

When A52-616 was low enough and travelling in a westerly direction
a green verey was fired to indicate all clear to land.
A/C had not been in radio contact with station.

A/C continued to circle and started an approach on runway 30
which was directly down wind; apparently the pilot not being fully aware
of the wind direction so a red verey was fired; A/C retracted wheels;
climbed and continued flight.

When A/C was passing drome in north westerly direction a white
verey was fired; to indicate it was clear to land from that end on
runway 12 which is 5117ft and also into wind, which was then SE 10 1/2 knots.

A/C continued circuit until it was approaching runway 35
which is 3550ft and only 36 deg from being a down wind landing; a red
verey was again fired; but A/C continued to land; landing at 1345C.

A/C was still travelling at high speed when end of runway was
reached; Pilot swerved machine to starboard; one runway light and one
range light fitting were struck at northern end of runway 35.

The leading edge of the elevator and underneath surface of
port tailplane was damaged; possibly when machine struck runway fittings.

At the time A/C was in the vicinity; the met section was taking
a balloon flight. Time of release 1330C; direction on release 138 deg
15-5 m.p.h. measured wind.
Observed wind from 1330-1400C SE 10-15k

Wind indicators were two wind socks; two flags; and smoke from
verey cartridges.
visibility during this period was 25-30 miles.

Forwarded.
P.L. O.C.
3/9/45.

E. CURTIS
E. Curtis
A.C.O.

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION
MINUTE PAPER

AS2-616
1/10/46
CIVIL AVIATION

C.12104 4.

SUBJECT: ACCIDENT TO MOSQUITO A52-616:

A/D.A.N.S. 14/9/46.

My analysis of this accident is as follows:-

1. The accident began when the pilot or operations officer at Coomallie Creek failed to prepare sufficiently for the trip by not ascertaining the Radio frequencies which may have to be used with stations on the route of flight. If the equipment did not permit of communication on standard frequencies the fault lay in a failure to advise.
2. The second stage of the accident developed when the Pilot failed to locate the two wind indicators at the aerodrome. It might be argued that his preparation for flight to a strange aerodrome should include a study of the aerodrome plan which would show the location of the wind indicators.
3. The third stage arose when the Control Officer warned the Pilot that he should not proceed with his landing as he was landing down wind (this reason may not have been known to the pilot; however, his selection of another runway would seem to suggest that he had guessed that this was the reason). I have little doubt had the landing been permitted to proceed on the long runway as intended, no accident would have happened and the Control Officer's judgment (in view of his inability apparently to advise the pilot of the correct landing direction) in warning off the Aircraft may be queried. (There is a need for an information circular on landing and take off characteristics). However, he had little reason to assume that after having been warned the pilot would not take every possible measure to assure himself the correct direction of landing.
4. The fourth stage developed when the pilot completed his landing on the shorter runway without apparently making time of the wind direction.

In examining what measures should be taken to protect against similar accidents in future the following provisions are considered:-


- (a) A more satisfactory form of wind-tee comment. We still await a satisfactory design.
- (b) A landing direction T for the signal square. ~~comment.~~ We are insufficiently staffed to ensure the proper changing of this T if of simple form a solution may be an electrically operated and remotely controlled T, but no design in existence and such an installation would be relatively costly.
- (c) Provision of a signal lamp giving alternate red and green. This signal has been promulgated as meaning land in opposite direction.
Comment: This signal is not universal and was not included in Chicago proposals.
- (d) A simple form of smoke pot which could be set going in emergency.

(e). no additions to existing.

Mr Cole

Refer reports to Dept of Air for
information
ALDONS

As the matter of standard ground equipment for an airfield would appear to come within one field of mutual discussion your comments would be appreciated.


(H. R. Adam.)
for A/Director of Airways.